











































María Zambrano and Hannah 
Arendt: A philosophical symbiosis






María Zambrano and Hannah 
Arendt were very nearly the same 
age and experienced similar histor-
ical and life circumstances—war 
and dictatorship in their countries 
of origin, exile, and a career in 
writing that included political 
writing. Zambrano considered the 
interior of the person in her study 
of democracy, while Arendt fo-
cused on exterior phenomena such 
as the masses in her consideration 
of totalitarianism.
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Resumen
María Zambrano y Hannah Arendt 
tenían casi la misma edad y experi-
mentaron circunstancias históricas 
y vitales semejantes —guerra y 
dictadura en sus países de origen, 
y una carrera como escritoras que 
incluía la temática política en sus 
obras—. Zambrano se centró en el 
interior de la persona en su estudio 
sobre la democracia, mientras que 
Arendt se enfocó más en fenóme-
nos exteriores como las masas en su 
estudio del totalitarismo.
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Julieta Lizaola has pointed out the coincidences in the lives of María 
Zambrano (1904-1991) and Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). As Europe-
an contemporaries (Zambrano born in Spain in 1904; Arendt in 
Germany in 1906), they lived through similar circumstances—war in 
their early years, and exile from their native countries as a result of 
these wars (both lived in the Americas—Zambrano in Mexico, Cuba, 
and Puerto Rico; Arendt in the United States). They both experi-
enced dictatorial forms of government and a sense of exclusion—
Zambrano as an exile; Arendt as an outcast. Lizaola concludes that:
Sin duda, el horizonte histórico que compartieron fue el que dirigió sus 
pensamientos a la reflexión cultural contemporánea y sus manifestacio-
nes políticas. En las entrelíneas de sus obras palpita no solo la necesidad 
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de dar respuesta a nuevas formas de dominación política, sino funda-
mentalmente a buscar explicación al sufrimiento que los hombres 
infligen unos a otros.1 
[Surely the political horizon that they shared was what directed their 
thought toward contemporary cultural reflection and its political 
manifestations. The need to counter new forms of political domination 
and a search for an explanation for why humans inflict suffering on one 
another lie in the interstices of their works]. 
Although Lizaola also notes that the two authors took different 
paths toward these ends, I wish to add to her thoughtful remarks, 
especially to point out that Zambrano’s way forward in her quest 
for answers to the troubling aspects of the politics of her times is 
fundamentally different from Arendt’s. Zambrano begins with the 
interior of the person and moves outward to the historical circum-
stances; whereas Arendt begins with the exterior—the historical 
circumstances--and how these affect the individual. This is not a 
study of influences between Arendt and Zambrano; the simultanei-
ty of their work and problems of language would make any influ-
ence of one on the other impossible.2 It is as Jesús Moreno Sanz 
says, an “impretendida alianza”3 [an unintentional alliance]. My 
comparison of their positions, especially relating to democracy  
and totalitarianism, is useful primarily to shed light on the ideas  
of each thinker.
Another important parallel in the lives of Zambrano and Arendt is 
that each studied with major philosophers—Zambrano with José 
Ortega y Gasset and Xavier Zubiri, and Arendt with Martin Heide-
gger and Karl Jaspers. These relationships were highly influential in 
the women’s formative years as thinkers, even though each forged 
her own unique path that diverged from those of her mentors. 
Interestingly, Arendt’s development as a political thinker included 
some ideas that echo Ortega’s notion of the mass man outlined in La 
rebelión de las masas [The Revolt of the Masses], although it is not at 
all certain that she was aware of Ortega’s work (having studied at 
Marburg where Ortega also studied some years before, it is possible 
that they had similar sources). For example, Arendt notes in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism that “the [totalitarian] movements showed 
that the politically neutral and indifferent masses could easily be the 
majority in a democratically ruled country, that therefore a democ-
racy could function according to rules which are actively recognized 
by only a minority”.4 Likewise, Zambrano mentions totalitarianism, 
which she calls absolutismo, especially in the latter sections of Persona 
y democracia. Importantly, both women were interested in Saint 
Augustine. Arendt wrote her doctoral dissertation on the concept of 
love in Augustine, while Zambrano offered an extensive commen-
tary on Augustine in La confesión: género literario [Two Confessions] 
and other works.5
1. Lizaola, J., “María Zambrano y Hannah 
Arendt ante el totalitarismo”, in Pablo 
Armando González Ulloa Aguirre, 
Christian Eduardo and Díaz Sosa (eds.), 
María Zambrano: Pensadora de nuestro 
tiempo, Mexico, Universidad Autónoma de 
México, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y 
Sociales, Plaza y Valdés, 2009, 22.
2. I should also note that Jesús Moreno 
Sanz has treated Zambrano alongside 
Arendt (and Edith Stein and Simone 
Weill), especially finding affinities between 
Arendt’s “corazón comprensivo” [under-
standing heart] and Zambrano’s “razón 
poética” [poetic reason] (Moreno Sanz, J., 
Edith Stein en compañía: Vidas filosóficas 
entrecruzadas de María Zambrano, Hannah 
Arendt y Simone Weil, Madrid: Plaza y 
Valdés, 2014, 3). 
3. Moreno Sanz, J., El logos oscuro, quoted 
in ibid., 7, n. 11.
4. Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism, San Diego, New York, London: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973, 312.
5. See Ortega Muñoz, J. F., “Apéndice: 
Presencia de san Agustín en María 
Zambrano,”Introducción al pensamiento de 
María Zambrano, Mexico: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1994, 255-267 for a 
comprehensive overview of Zambrano’s 
writings that touch on Saint Augustine.












































As noted above, both María Zambrano and Hannah Arendt experi-
enced protracted exile from their native countries. José Luis Abellán 
divides exile experiences into three types—destierro [banishment; 
exile], in which the exiled person continues to maintain close ties 
with people in the home country while residing elsewhere; transtier-
ro [transplanted; exiled], in which the exile puts down roots in 
another country, and “exilio propiamente dicho” [exile proper], in 
which the exile exists as though floating through geographical spaces 
with no specific ties to any of them. Abellán places Zambrano in the 
latter category,6 and although he does not address Hannah Arendt, 
surely he would have called her a transterrada for having established 
herself in her personal and professional life in the United States.
The differences in circumstances notwithstanding, the exile experi-
ence had an important influence on each woman’s life and work. As 
Costica Bradatan observes: 
Each person who survives this uprooting [exile] and finds himself in 
exile experiences an existential earthquake of sorts: everything turns 
upside down, all certitudes are shattered. The world around you ceases 
to be that solid, reliable presence in which you used to feel comfort-
able, and turns into ruin—cold and foreign... [Bradatan concludes 
that] “you shall leave everything you love most: this is the arrow that 
the bow of exile shoots first” [as Dante wrote in “Paradiso”].7 
However, Bradatan finds that such an “existential earthquake” also 
yields certain benefits, allowing the exiled person to see things in a 
different light that can be creative: “Yet exile, should you survive it, 
can be the greatest of philosophical gifts, a blessing in disguise. For 
when your old world goes down it takes with it all your assump-
tions, commonplaces, prejudices and preconceived ideas”.8 Thus, 
exile means a kind of freedom from old baggage; Bradatan con-
cludes that “Exiles always travel light”.9 Claudio Guillén expressed  
a similar notion as “counter-exile”, which allows the author creative 
freedom and personal enrichment.10 Beatriz Caballero Rodríguez 
notes that the time Zambrano spent in Puerto Rico, and which 
produced Isla de Puerto Rico. Nostalgia y esperanza de un mundo 
mejor, was fundamental to Zambrano developing some of her 
political views:
Zambrano uses these pages to put forward some ideas that she would 
develop in future works: especially, the meaning of democracy, not just 
as a system of governance, but more essentially as a lifestyle on the one 
hand and the implications of the incomplete birth of human beings on 
the other.11
It is hard to believe, as I have speculated elsewhere, that María 
Zambrano would have developed her philosophy of the soul so thor-
oughly had she remained in Spain under the watchful eye of her 
teacher José Ortega y Gasset. Ortega harshly critiqued her 1934arti-
6. Abellán, J. L., María Zambrano: Una 
pensadora de nuestro tiempo, Barcelona, 
Anthropos, 2006, 59.
7. Costica Bradatan, “The Wisdom of 




10. Guillén, C., “On the Literature of 
Exile and Counter Exile,” Books Abroad 
50 (1976), 271.
11. Caballero Rodríguez, B., A Life of 
Poetic Reason and Political Commitment, 
Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2017, 65.
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cle “Hacia un saber sobre el alma” [Towards a knowledge of the 
soul], although he did publish it in his prestigious journal Revista de 
Occidente [Occidental journal]. One also has to wonder if Zambra-
no would have developed her theory of democracy and the person 
without the distance that exile created from the failed Spanish 
Republic and without her proximity to Inés María Mendoza in 
Puerto Rico and Rome. Correspondence uncovered by Madeline 
Cámara reveals that the dialogue between the Puerto Rican gover-
nor’s wife and Zambrano was instrumental to Zambrano’s complet-
ing of Persona y democracia [Person and democracy].12 
María Zambrano’s approach to dissecting democracy centers on her 
distinction between the individuo [individual; I] and the persona 
[person], a distinction that allows Zambrano to make certain points 
about totalitarianism that Arendt, lacking such a differentiation, 
does not. Lizaola conflates individuo and persona in Zambrano’s 
philosophy, claiming that her goal is to “esbozar de qué manera la 
negación del individuo, de la persona, se alzó como justificación 
política para su aniquilación”13 [outline how negating the individual, 
the person, was raised as a political justification for its annihilation]. 
However, it is important to remember that Zambrano theorized that 
“Cada hombre está formado por un yo y una persona”14 [Each 
human being is formed of an I and a person]. For Zambrano the 
person includes the I and transcends it. The I is a sort of an immo-
bile guardian that watches over or pays attention while the person is 
the mask by means of which we enter into relations with others 
(both human and divine). The authentic person has a moral stance 
with regard to society. In describing the person, Zambrano has 
recourse to the notion of alienation, which is so important to 
existentialism. She distinguishes between an authentic self—perso-
na—and a personaje [personage or fictitious character]:
La cuestión es que frente a cualquier sujeto de la acción habría que 
preguntarse, ¿quién es? ¿es una persona real, con su sustancia propia, o 
es solamente el personaje inventado, máscara de un delirio? Si es este 
último estamos tratando entonces con alguien que es otro; otro no ya 
para mí, o para los demás, sino otro para sí mismo. Su verdadera 
persona está sojuzgada, yace víctima del personaje que lo sustituye.15 
[The question is that when confronted with any subject of an action we 
must ask, who is it? Is it a real person, with his/her own substance, or is 
it only an invented personage, the mask of a delirium? If it is the latter 
then we are dealing with someone that is the other: not other for me or 
for everyone else, but other to him or herself. His or her true persona is 
subjugated, is the victim of the personage that substitutes for it.]
Zambrano represents this situation of the authentic self—the 
person—as a struggle: “Lo normal es padecerlo [la semiena-
jenación] mas de un modo en el que la persona verdadera va 
ganando terreno al personaje... Pues en ser persona hay algo absolu-
to, es algo absoluto” 16 [The normal thing is to put up with the 
12. Cámara, M., “Estancias y ensueños de 
María Zambrano en Puerto Rico en 
diálogo con Inés María Mendoza” in 
Antígona 3, 2009, 69-79. Cámara 
demonstrates how conversations that 
Zambrano and Mendoza had in Rome in 
1955 assisted Zambrano in completing her 
book Persona y democracia: “Por este 
sendero de como se inserta la persona en la 
Historia se encuentran ambas intelectuales 
hispanas en el tema de la democracia y esta 
vez sí de modo real y de muy relevantes 
consecuencias públicas y privadas... Ese 
tipo de conversación que solo puede darse 
entre dos mujeres, donde todo se mezcla: 
familia, nación, penas, esperanzas; y cuyas 
coordenadas vitales son las más adecuadas, 
creo, para repensar la democracia” (73, 75) 
[By this means of how the person inserts 
him or herself into history both Hispanic 
intellectuals find themselves confronted 
with the theme of democracy and now in 
a very real way with very relevant public 
and private consequences... This kind of 
conversation that can only occur between 
two women in which everything is mixed 
in: family, nation, disappointments, hopes 
and, I believe, whose vital coordinates are 
the most apt for rethinking democracy].
13. Lizaola, J., Op. cit., 22.
14. Zambrano, M., Persona y democracia: 
La historia sacrificial, Barcelona, Anthro-
pos, 1988, 79. 
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 81.












































semi-alienation in a way that the true person gains ground over the 
personage... There is something absolute in being a person; being a 
person is absolute].17 Carmen Revilla points out that it is precisely 
in Persona y democracia that Zambrano develops “la distinción entre 
persona y yo”18 [the distinction between person and I]. Where Zam-
brano and Arendt meet is on the question of absolutism. As Car-
men Revilla points out:
Según Zambrano, la tragedia de la historia en Occidente es la violencia 
del absolutismo, el querer algo absolutamente, aunque sea hacer su 
propia historia, o vivir la propia vida: es un proceso sin objetivos, 
solamente se quiere, ‘querer por querer’, sin más justificación que el 
querer, es la violencia más peligrosa.19 
[According to Zambrano, the tragedy of Western history is the violence 
of absolutism, wanting something absolutely, even though it means 
making one’s own history or living one’s own life, it is a process 
without objectives, one just wants, “desiring just to desire”, without 
any justification other than desiring, is the most dangerous violence].
On the issue of absolutism Zambrano’s distinction between person 
and individual is particularly useful. As Carmen Revilla points out, 
“El absolutismo está en contra de la persona, quiere absolutamente 
‘ser’ y lo que provoca es violencia y destrucción” 20 [Absolutism is 
against the person; it wants “to be” absolutely and what it provokes 
is violence and destruction].
Being separated from her homeland, rather than turning Hannah 
Arendt inward as it did María Zambrano, caused her to cast her 
critical eye upon society. Chapter 10 of The Origins of Totalitarian-
ism, titled “A Classless Society”, is particularly illustrative. Arendt 
begins the chapter by considering the masses. Unlike Zambrano, 
whose political models (doubtless Franco, although Arendt would 
not have called his regime totalitarian)21 remain in the abstract, 
Arendt names names—Stalin, Lenin, Hitler. Arendt points out that 
politically neutral and indifferent masses could be in the majority in 
democratically ruled countries, and thus a democracy “could 
function according to rules which are actively recognized by only a 
minority”.22 Arendt additionally notes that totalitarian movements, 
unlike democratic forms of government, do not believe that the 
politically indifferent masses need to be taken into account, “that 
they were truly neutral and constituted no more than the inarticu-
late backward setting for the political life of the nation”.23 As Beatriz 
Caballero Rodríguez aptly notes, Zambrano also warns against the 
mass mentality: 
Echoing one of her recurrent preoccupations during the late 1930s, 
Zambrano reminds the reader that one of the dangers people face is 
that of becoming a mass. For her, this happens as a result of demagogy, 
which alienates people from reality, thus altering their sense of respon-
sibility, consciousness and time.24
17. In the term “absolute person” 
Zambrano seems to be echoing Max 
Scheler’s notion of the absolute person. As 
I have noted elsewhere, Zambrano and her 
friend Rosa Chacel were greatly influenced 
by their youthful readings in Scheler (see 
my “Self-Consciousness in Rosa Chacel 
and María Zambrano”, in Bucknell Review, 
39, 1995, 52-70). 
18. Revilla, C., “María Zambrano ante la 
crisis de la modernidad”, in Pablo 
Armando González Ulloa Aguirre, 
Christian Eduardo and Díaz Sosa (eds.), 
María Zambrano: Pensadora de nuestro 
tiempo, México, Universidad Autónoma de 
México, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y 
Sociales, Plaza y Valdés, 2009, 140.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 155.
21. For Arendt there are only two 
totalitarian regimes in modern times —
those of Hitler and Stalin. For a state to be 
totalitarian in her definition, it must break 
up all allegiances (between family, friends, 
members of organizations), except to the 
state. It does this by creating a climate of 
fear in which anyone can be a spy for the 
state and can accuse anyone else—even 
family members—of being enemies of the 
state. In this situation, the best way to 
avoid being accused of being an enemy of 
the state is to accuse others of this crime.
22. Arendt, H., Op. cit., 312.
23. Ibid.
24. Caballero, Op. cit., 88.
17499_aurora_20_tripa.indd   42 21/3/19   9:43
43
aurora | n.º 20 | 2019 
Roberta Johnson
issn: 1575-5045 | issn-e: 2014-9107 | doi: 10.1344/Aurora2019.20.4
Additionally, Arendt points out that:
Democratic freedoms may be based on the equality of all citizens 
before the law; yet they acquire their meaning and function organically 
only where the citizens belong to and are represented by groups or 
form a social and political hierarchy.25 
Like Zambrano, Arendt critiques individualism. While Zambrano 
pits personhood against individualism, Arendt asserts that individu-
alism characterized the bourgeoisie’s and the mob’s attitude toward 
life, allowing the totalitarian movements to “rightly claim that they 
were the first truly antibourgeois parties”.26 The remainder of 
Arendt’s chapter on “A Classless Society” is a summation of the 
horrors of the Stalinist regime that systematically eradicated those 
pertaining to the peasant and other classes in the 1930s. Once she 
had developed her ideas on the individual and the person in the 
early chapters of Persona y democracia, Zambrano also dealt with 
society, especially social class and the masses in the later chapters. 
For example, she notes that being a person is prior to belonging to a 
social class.27 This situation makes insertion in a social class less 
onerous: “si el ser persona es lo que verdaderamente cuenta no sería 
tan nefasto el que hubiese diferentes clases, pues por encima de su 
diversidad, y aun en ella, sería visible la unidad del ser persona, de 
vivir personalmente”28 [if being a person is what truly matters it 
wouldn’t be so terrible to have different classes, since in addition to 
their diversity and even within it, the unity of being a person, to live 
personally, would be visible]. 
Hannah Arendt likewise addresses individualism, which she attrib-
utes to the breakdown of the class system. For her individualism is a 
bourgeois phenomenon, which generated a competitive and acquisi-
tive society that “produced apathy and even hostility toward public 
life”.29 Arendt blames these bourgeois individualistic attitudes for 
the rise of dictatorial regimes: 
These bourgeois attitudes are very useful for those forms of dictatorship 
in which a ‘strong man’ takes upon himself the troublesome responsibi-
lity for the conduct of public affairs; they are the positive hindrance to 
totalitarian movements which can tolerate bourgeois individualism no 
more than any other kind of individualism.30 
Zambrano has a similar view of individualism, which she believes 
creates a society of individuals, an aggregation, “como si el individuo 
hubiera existido siempre”31 [as if the individual had always existed]. 
However, Zambrano’s concept of the individual is more subtle and 
complete than Arendt’s thanks to her comparison of the individual 
and the person, which she considers to be the individual endowed 
with consciousness, “que se sabe a sí mismo y que se entiende a sí 
mismo como valor supremo, como última finalidad terrestre...”32 
[that knows him/herself and understands him/herself as a supreme 
25. Arendt, H., Ibid.
26. Arendt, Ibid., 314.
27. Zambrano, M., Persona y democracia, 
135.
28. Ibid, 136.
29. Arendt, H., 313.
30. Ibid.
31. Zambrano, M., Persona y democracia, 
102.
32. Ibid., 103.












































value, as the ultimate terrestrial goal]. Arendt seems to employ the 
term “individual” in a similar way to Zambrano’s notion of “per-
son”—that is, a fully functioning human being that includes a rich 
interior life and full participation in public life, although Arendt 
focuses on the public rather than the private sphere.
However, on the whole, Zambrano focuses on the nature of person-
hood in democratic forms of government, while Arendt concen-
trates on the features of society that allow totalitarianism to flourish. 
Her main tenant is that in order for totalitarianism to succeed a 
country must have a sufficiently large mass population. Arendt 
distinguishes between the “mob” and the “mass”. “The masses”, she 
writes, “do not inherit, as the mob does—albeit in a perverted 
form—the standards and attitudes of the dominating class, but 
reflect and somehow pervert the standards and attitudes toward 
public affairs of all classes”.33 Arendt points out that the success of 
totalitarian governments can be attributed to two causes that 
countermand aspects of democracy: 1) that everyone was politically 
active in some way, and 2) that parliamentary majorities correspond-
ed to the reality of the country. Arendt astutely sees little difference 
between the totalitarianism of Nazism or Bolshevism in their intent 
and tactics with regard to the masses.
While Zambrano and Arendt approach the nature of the govern-
ments of their time from different perspectives—Zambrano from 
the interior of the person; Arendt from a social perspective—the two 
come together in aligning political dynamics with social class. 
Arendt understands the success of totalitarianism in terms of the 
melting of social classes into the masses:
This generation [that of the First World War] remembered the war as 
the great prelude to the breakdown of classes and their transformation 
into masses. War with its constant murderous arbitrariness, became the 
symbol for death, the “great equalizer” and therefore the true father of a 
new world order. The passion for equality and justice, the longing to 
transcend narrow and meaningless class lines, to abandon stupid 
privileges and prejudices, seemed to find in war a way out of the old 
condescending attitudes of pity for the oppressed and disinherited. In 
times of growing misery and individual helplessness, it seems as 
difficult to resist pity when it grows into an all-devouring passion as it 
is not to resent its very boundlessness, which seems to kill human 
dignity with a more deadly certainty than misery itself.34
If Arendt approached totalitarianism from the exterior social condi-
tions that made it possible, Zambrano conceived its opposite—de-
mocracy—from the interior or personal: “La primera revolución 
democrática conocida sería aquella en virtud de la cual cada hombre 
tiene su alma —la suya propia, aquí sobre la tierra— cumplida en 
Egipto por Osiris”35 [The first known democratic revolution would 
be that by which each person has his/her soul—his/her own soul 
here on Earth—fulfilled in Egypt by Osiris]. The logical conclusion 
33. Arendt, H., Op.cit., 314.
34. Arendt, H., Op. cit., 329.
35. Zambrano, M., Op. cit., 109.
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is that the eradication of Zambrano’s “person” leads to the creation 
of Arendt’s masses which provide the fodder for totalitarianism.
Read together, the two thinkers provide a complete philosophical 
map for understanding the dynamics of democracy and totalitarian-
ism. Reading Zambrano and Arendt in the context of the direction 
some Western democracies have taken in the last several years, 
makes it clear that their political ideas and analyses, while formulat-
ed in different times and circumstances, are very relevant today. 
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